After presenting four basic ontological frameworks for social being, the paper adopts the two-layered approach defended by Bhaskar and Poli. Within this framework, the relation between emergents and latents is briefly described. Since most emergents are ephemeral (weak signals), the problem arises of what may eventually stabilize emergents, and values are seen as promising stabilizers for emerging new behaviors. By exploiting the case of technological innovation, the paper raises the broader issue of social innovation and the problem of its stabilization.
Four Ontological Frameworks
Since the early days of sociology, the ontology underlying sociological theories has been split between 'individualists' and 'holists'. A variety of terms has been used to denote the differences between the two camps, including the differences between voluntarism and determinism, structure and agency, and the micro-macro opposition. Aside from these terminological variations, both individualists and holists defend a mono-layered ontology: there is only one authentically 'real' level of social reality, and any other level is apparent, in the sense that the entities pertaining to this other level of reality do not exist in any acceptable sense of the expression 'real existence'. For the individualists, only individual agents exist, and any reference to groups, classes, structures, or systems (as in 'social structure' or, even worse, the 'social system') is shorthand with no ontological weight. For the holists, on the other hand, only social structures exist, and the individuals exemplifying them are but occasional pegs for available holes, such as fillers of available roles. Both sides claim that only one of the two levels (respectively, individuals and structures) refers to 'really' real entities, while the other level is unreal in the sense that it refers to apparent or derivative entities, i.e. entities that can be fully analyzed, without residua, in terms of 'really' real entities. The entities that are really real for the individualists are apparent or unreal for the holists, and vice versa (Bhaskar 1998 , Archer 1995 . Their opposition notwithstanding, Roy Bhaskar long ago noted that both individualists and holists share the same empiricist bias. Getting rid of this bias opens up new ontological avenues. In particular, it makes possible a multi-layered social ontology in which both social individuals and social structures acquire the status of legitimate, authentic ontological entities, so that their interactions can be studied (Bhaskar 1998 , Archer 1995 , Archer et al 1998 , Elder-Vass 2012 . This is a major shift towards an ontology possibly able to clarify the complexity of social being better. In what follows, I shall remain within the framework of a two-layered social ontology.
Two more models emerge from Bhaskar's twolayered ontology: either the two layers are stages of a single overall process in which individuals and their actions generate structures, which then, once generated, constrain individuals and their actions (the 'dialectical' model well represented by Berger and Luckmann 1966), or the two layers refer to two ontologically different processes organized in such a way that the higher process is both categorially autonomous and existentially dependent on the lower process (which implies that the higher level cannot exist without the activities pertaining to the lower level). These two features (categorial autonomy and existential dependence) define the relation between levels of reality that I have called 'super-position' (Poli 2012 , see also Poli 2001 and 2007 . The twolayered two-process ontology is the model defended by Bhaskar himself. While Bhaskar's terminology is different from mine, our ideas are very similar. In what follows, I shall work from within the two-layer model defended by Bhaskar and myself. Furthermore, of the two major ties governing systems, namely the structural decomposition into subsystems, occasionally known as parts, and the functional insertion into higher-order systems, I shall focus on the former alone.
Emergence and Latents
Two major issues for any social ontology are the problem of emergence and the problem of latents (Poli 2011) . Emergence concerns the conditions that make the constitution of the higher level possible. Two different issues should be distinguished here: namely, the 'reproduction' of the higher level through the activities performed at the lower one, and the 'internal' logic of the higher level, that is, the mutual dynamic adjustments among the nodes of the higher level.
According to Bhaskar, one of the main differences between his model and the dialectical model defended by Berger and Luckmann consists in the different natures of the relations between the two layers. Whilst Berger and Luckmann claim that the lower level generates the higher level, Bhaskar sees the relation between the two levels as a relation of reproduction (Luhmann defends a similar position: see for instance Luhmann 1985; see also Poli 2010) . This amounts to claiming that the higher level is 'always' there as soon as the lower level is given.
The simplest way to understand the issue is to note that every act that one performs includes latent aspects which only occasionally become visible, but nevertheless exert their influence on the higher level. When an employee goes to work to earn her salary, as she enters her bureau, she reproduces the difference between employees and employers and, more generally, the division of labor system. When an academic goes to her class to teach a subject (and earn a salary), as she enters the class she reproduces the difference between teachers and pupils, and, more generally, she reproduces the educational system. Two aspects need mentioning. First, 'reproduction' in this context includes variation and transformation: behaviors can be adjusted, reinterpreted, or even changed. The variations implicit in reproduction imply that there are always constant adjustments between and among roles. Second, the higher level is itself stratified into (at least) the reproduction of specific relations (employees vs. employers, teachers vs. pupils) and the reproduction of the functional subsystems to which these relations pertain (the labor market, the educational system).
Interactions among agents generate variations of previous behaviors, and even utterly new behaviors. As a result, new emergents continuously arise. Most of them are feeble, ephemeral. They may last for a while and then disappear. Some other novelties may instead last longer, and even grow to become new, stable behavioral patterns.
Weak Signals
Trends and behaviors grow in more or less complex patterns, and they eventually decline. The capacity to discern a wide variety of patterns is precisely what makes an expert an expert. The very beginning of a trend or behavior, however, is a critical point. Critical points can occasionally be seen from within trends (e.g., flection points, such as when a positive trend becomes negative or vice versa), but there is apparently no way to detect a singularity without a supporting trend. Weak signals (i.e. seeds of change or early warning signals) are such a troublesome issue precisely because they are not part of an already formed trend. They may eventually become the beginning of a trend. But when they occur, they are 'stateless' so to speak; the trend of which they will eventually become the beginning still does not exist.
Emergents and Values
Many emergents do not stabilize. Though some do. Two main possibilities arise here. Emergent ephemeral behaviors may grow, develop, and become stabilized under the effect of two possible catalysts: either the underlying processes determining emergence grow and become stable (stabilization from below) or the emergent may find room within the meshes of the higher ontological level. In order for this to happen, the emergent should first be recognized and accepted, and finally stabilized. Seen from the point of view of interacting agents, these activities of finding room, being recognized, accepted, and stabilized are perceived as values. 'Value' here is used in a broad sense to include any kind of value (ethical, aesthetic, economic, etc.) . Ted Fuller, in particular, has investigated the role of values as stabilizers of emergents, especially in the field of management (see references).
The role performed by values as stabilizers of emergents explains why the violation of established behavioral patterns (such as those shaping common sense) is often perceived as a normative violation, and not just as a breach of abstract patterns. The question arises as to whether any new kind of emergent behavior is forced to breach normative rules. A precondition for this to happen is that the social landscape be fully and completely institutionalized, a situation rarely if ever encountered. As a consequence, some room is always present for innovative emergents that may arise without having to breach previously settled norms.
Social Innovation
As Tuomi 2002 convincingly shows, traditional models of innovation are often misleading -not least because they often rely on linear models of innovation. Interactions like those between structure and function, i.e. the fact that the same structure can perform different functions and the same function can be implemented by different structures, can also be detected in the case of relations between products and uses: the same product can be used in different ways, and the same functional use may be based on different products. In this sense, technologies come into the world only half-made: social practices complete them; and when social practices change, new aspects of the same product may emerge, new potentialities arise, and innovation occurs. Any given product may be "used in unanticipated ways, and perhaps no one uses it the way its designers expected it to be used". In other words, "In a very fundamental sense, it is the user who invents the product" (Tuomi 2002, 10) . Examples abound. The interactive use of the telephone was invented by American housewives in the 1930s, and SMS have been unexpectedly appropriated by teenagers. In both cases, the engineers that invented the devices had other purposes in mind. As Tuomi caustically adds "People were not that interested in listening to concerts using a telephone or maintaining recipes in computers" (Tuomi 2002, 24) .
Most technologies enter the market with preestablished modes of use. The social practices that arise around them may however change their meaning by adding new unexpected uses or not exploiting some of their capacities. The former is patently the most interesting case, in the sense that unintended uses may channel the evolution of the product in new, very different directions. Even more significant is the possibility that new, creative uses will articulate needs that did not exist before their emergence. Properly speaking, as they do so, new layers of reality emerge.
Technological innovation is but a tiny fragment of social innovation. While the latter may be centered on technical products, social practice itself is the source of all types of social innovation. Most of them are ephemeral and rapidly vanish. Others are stabilized and in time may even become institutionalized. Providing that Fuller is right, values are possible catalysts for the stabilization of emergent novelties. However, the two-layered framework described at the beginning of the paper suggests that something more is probably at work, something operating at the higher level of social reality, the level of the reproduction of social structures.
